The prolonged systemic crisis in international financial markets commencing in 2007 was also a crisis in corporate governance and regulation. The apparent ascendancy of Anglo-American markets and governance institutions was profoundly questioned by the scale and contagion of the global financial crisis. Instead of risk being hedged, it had become inter-connected and international, and unknown. The market capitalisation of the stock markets of the world had peaked at $62 trillion at the end of 2007, but were by October 2008 in free fall, having lost $33 trillion dollars, over half of their value in12 months of unrelenting financial and corporate failures. A debate has continued for some time about the costs and benefits of the financialisation of advanced industrial economies. The long progression of financial crises around the world served as a reminder that the system is neither self-regulating or robust. The explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions took such spectacular risks with extremely leveraged positions on many securities and derivatives, and the risk management, governance and ethical environment that allowed such conduct to take place is demands detailed analysis.
Thomas Clarke
The prolonged systemic crisis in international financial markets commencing in 2007/ 2008 was also a crisis in corporate governance and regulation. The most severe financial disaster since the Great Depression of the 1930s exposed the dangers of unregulated financial markets and nominal corporate governance. The crisis originated in Wall Street where de-regulation unleashed highly incentivised investment banks to flood world markets with toxic financial products. As a stunning series of banks and investment companies collapsed in the United States and then in Europe, a frightening dimension of the global economy became fully apparent: a new world disorder of violently volatile markets and deep financial insecurity. Advocating systemic change President Nicolas Sarkozy of France proclaimed, "The world came within a whisker of catastrophe. We can't run the risk of it happening again. Self-regulation as a way of solving all problems is finished. Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market that always knows best is finished" (Washington Post 28 September 2008), as if presidential rhetoric alone could sweep away an enveloping, financially driven political economy. For decades Europe has actively sought deeper financial integration with the United States, reducing barriers to trade, and liberalizing markets, leading onwards towards globalisation. Transatlantic integration is forging economic relations involving financial markets, services, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and other industry sectors (CTR/CEPS 2005) . However, for this effort at integrating markets and businesses to succeed, a supporting integration of institutions, regulation and corporate governance is required. European legal institutions, regulatory, governance and accounting practices face insistent pressures to adapt to the reality of international competitive markets. The European relationship-based corporate governance systems in particular are often criticised as being inherently less efficient than the Anglo-American market based systems. became fearful of the potential scale of the sub-prime mortgages concealed in the securities they had bought. As a result banks refused to lend to each other because of increased counter-party risk that other banks might default. A solvency crisis ensued as banks were slow to admit to the great holes in their accounts the sub-prime mortgages had caused (partly because they were themselves unaware of the seriousness of the problem), and the difficulty in raising capital to restore their balance sheets. As an increasing number of financial institutions collapsed in the US, UK, and Europe, successive government efforts to rescue individual institutions, and to offer general support for the financial system, did not succeed in restoring confidence as markets continued in free-fall, with stock exchanges across the world losing half their value ( Figure 1 ). 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2008 WALL STREET FINANCIAL CRISIS "America's financial institutions have not managed risk; they have created it" (Joseph Stiglitz 2008a).

Origins of the Crisis
In the cyclical way markets work, the origins of the 2008 financial crisis may be found in the solutions to the previous market crisis. The US Federal Reserve under the sage Alan Greenspan responded to the collapse of confidence caused by the dot-com disaster and Enron failures in 2001/2002 by reducing US interest rates to one per cent, their lowest in 45 years, flooding the market with cheap credit to jump-start the economy back into life. US business did recover faster than expected, but the cheap credit had washed into the financial services and housing sectors producing the largest speculative bubbles ever witnessed in the American economy (Fleckenstein 2008) . The scene was set by the 1999 dismantling of the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act which had separated commercial banking from investment banking and insurance services, opening the way for a consolidation of the vastly expanding and increasingly competitive US financial services industry. Phillips (2008:5) describes this as a "burgeoning debt and credit complex": "Vendors of credit cards, issuers of mortgages and bonds, architects of asset-backed securities and structured investment vehicles -occupied the leading edge. The behemoth financial conglomerates, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase et al, were liberated in 1999 for the first time since the 1930s to marshal banking, insurance, securities, and real estate under a single, vaulting institutional roof."
In this newly emboldened finance sector the name of the game was leverage -the capacity to access vast amounts of credit cheaply to takeover businesses and to do deals. Wall Street investment banks and hedge funds flourished with their new found access to cheap credit. Exotic financial instruments were devised and marketed internationally: futures, options and swaps evolved into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), credit default swaps (CDSs), and many other acronyms, all of which packaged vast amounts of debt to be traded on the securities markets.
Abandoning their traditional financial conservatism banks looked beyond taking deposits and lending to the new businesses of wealth management, and eagerly adopted new instruments and business models. As the IMF put it "Banking systems in the major countries have gone through a process of disintermediation-that is, a greater share of financial intermediation is now taking place through tradable securities (rather than bank loans and deposits)…Banks have increasingly moved financial risks (especially credit risks) off their balance sheets and into securities markets-for example, by pooling and converting assets into tradable securities and entering into interest rate swaps and other derivatives transactions-in response both to regulatory incentives such as capital requirements and to internal incentives to improve risk-adjusted returns on capital for shareholders and to be more competitive… Securitization makes the pricing and allocation of capital more efficient because changes in financial risks are reflected much more quickly in asset prices and flows than on bank balance sheets. The downside is that markets have become more volatile, and this volatility could pose a threat to financial stability" (2002:3).
Global Derivatives Markets
As the new financial instruments were developed and marketed, the securities markets grew Derivatives allow financial institutions and corporations to take greater and more complex risks such as issuing more mortgages and corporate debt, because they may protect debt holders against losses. Since derivatives contracts are widely traded, risk may be further limited, though this increases the number of parties exposed if defaults occur. "Complex derivatives were at the heart of the credit market turmoil that rippled through financial markets in 2007, raising concerns about the financial players' abilities to manage risk as capital markets rapidly evolve. Unlike equities, debt securities and bank deposits, which represent financial claims against future earnings by households and companies, derivatives are risk-shifting agreements among financial market participants" (McKinsey 2008:20 (Rosen 2007; Schwarcz 2008) . It is easy to see why securitisation is seen as a "shadow banking system", whereby off balance sheet entities and over the counter (OTC) credit instruments lie outside the reach of regulators and capital adequacy guidelines, making risk increasingly difficult to price, manage and quantify (Whalen 2008; Schwarcz 2008) . The increasing complexity of securitisation and the change in lending practices to "originate to distribute" led to acute moral hazard, where each participant in the mortgage chain was trying to make continuously greater returns whilst assuming that they passed on all the associated risks to other participants (Lewis 2007; Ee & Xiong 2008) . Financial innovation was meant to distribute risks evenly throughout the financial system, thus reducing the risk for the system as a whole, however increased risk tolerance, moral hazard and an insatiable thirst for return pushed all participants to borrow larger sums and to take increasingly bigger bets. The result was that whilst risk was dispersed for the individual players, it was amplified for the entire financial system (Lim 2008 )".
The financial system was exposed as the US housing bubble burst as house mortgage holders exhausted the teaser low rates that had enticed them into borrowing, and were confronted by much higher rates of repayment they could not afford. With non-recursive loans in the US, mortgagees could simply walk away from their debt, posting the keys back to the bank ('jingle mail') leaving properties in many inner urban areas to become derelict, as advancing foreclosures emptied whole neighbourhoods in some cities. This surge in mortgage defaults and foreclosures was followed by a plunge in the prices of mortgage-backed securities. The sub-prime crisis unfolded as it became apparent that sub-prime mortgages had been mixed with other assets in CDOs, somehow given double A ratings by the ratings agencies, and marketed world-wide.
Innovative securities originally conceived to insulate against risk, had through misuse metastasized into the wide distribution of acutely dangerous and uncontrollable risks. Adrian Cadbury observed on this: "I suggest that there are two aspects of what went wrong. One was that in general risk was undervalued by the financial institutions. The second was that the banks simply did not know where their risks lay. Sub-prime mortgages were parcelled out by banks and sold through perhaps three or four levels of intermediary. When house prices fell people handed in their keys. The intermediaries found they were in the property business which they could not finance and in turn each level went bust. The banks found that they were ultimately responsible, a contingent liability they were unaware of and had not provided for. I think a sound rule is that if you do not understand the business you are getting into, don't!" The opaqueness and complexity of the financial instruments which served as a means to conceal the toxicity of the trillions of dollars of securities developed and sold by the investment banks returned to haunt them with the realization that no international financial institution fully understood how much of these subprime assets were buried in their portfolios, and the growing possibility of counter-party failure, the credit markets seized up, and banks and other financial institutions began falling over as they announced huge write downs, not only in the US, but the UK, and throughout Europe ( Table 1) .
Instead of risk being hedged, it had become inter-connected and international, and unknown. 
US FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FAILURES
As financial institutions, over-burdened with debt, desperately attempted to deleverage by selling assets, including the mortgage backed securities, the cruel 'paradox of deleveraging' was exposed: that the fire-sale of assets simply drives asset prices down, and left the banks in an required to obtain the right to purchase non-voting stock in companies that participated in the sale of assets giving the government an equity interest in the companies. The Treasury was required to maximise assistance to homeowners facing foreclosure. Finally companies participating in the scheme were prohibited from offering executives incentives to take excessive risks, or to offer golden parachutes to executives, and were given the right to clawback senior executive bonuses if they were later found to be based on inaccurate data. When stock markets opened the following Monday after the Act was passed, the Dow Jones was down 700 points, the FTSE down 7.9%, the Dax down 7.1%, and France's CAC 40 down 9%, revealing that markets were not going to be easily reassured, and the financial crisis was becoming internationally contagious.
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FAILURES Figure 4 Market Capitalization and Equity Book Values of Financial Institutions 2006-2008 (Billions of US dollars)
Source IMF (2008a:22) All over Europe as the contagion spread the impact of the subprime crisis was wreaking havoc in financial institutions, threatening entire financial systems, and severely undermining the fragile unity of the European Union (Appendix 1). The scale of the crisis for European financial institutions, relative to the size of the sector, was becoming just as serious as for US financial institutions ( Figure 4 ). The first tremors of the crisis were felt in the UK, which rivals the US as the centre of the international financial system. Among the early casualties of the subprime crisis were Northern Rock, one of the largest mortgage lenders in the UK, which depended on the wholesale market for short term credit. Northern Rock could not raise sufficient capital in September 2007, and after a run on the bank reminiscent of the 1920s, was effectively nationalised by the UK government trying desperately to contain an impending mass public financial panic. As the credit crisis worsened for institutions used to relying on the wholesale market and inter-bank lending, a liquidity crisis gripped the major British banks, while their share prices collapsed. In September 2008 HBOS, the UK's largest mortgage lender was sold to
Lloyds TSB as the government suspended the regulations limiting maximum market share of any one bank. Bradford and Bingley, another large mortgage provider was nationalised by the government, with the sale of its savings arm to Abbey owned by the Spanish Santander. As panic selling continued on the London Stock Exchange with HBOS and Bank of Scotland bank shares losing 40% of their value in a single day's trading, the UK government intervened with a £500 billion (US$850) billion rescue package for eight of the largest UK banks intended to restore stability to the system. This package consisted of up to £50 billion in capital investment for the banks in exchange for preference shares, short-term loans up to £200 billion from the Bank of England, and loan guarantees for banks lending to each other of up to £250 billion. The offer of assistance was conditional on restraint in executive incentives and rewards and on dividend payments, and that banks must be able to lend to small businesses and home owners.
In other European countries the response to the crisis was largely managed on a national basis as financial institutions failed. Fortis one of the world's largest banking, insurance and investment companies was rescued by the Netherlands nationalising its Dutch operations, and France's BNP Paribas buying its Belgian and Luxemburg operations. Dexia the Belgian financial services company was rescued by the French, Belgian, and Luxemburg governments. As the entire banking system of Iceland began to fail, the government invested €600 million for a 75% stake in Brown was invited (the UK not being a member of the Eurozone) to explain the measures the UK government had adopted. There was agreement to implement a coordinated framework of action to take preference shares in banks and underwrite interbank lending. A few days later a meeting of all EU leaders confirmed support for this approach. Brown argued for a two stage process: ""Stage one was to stabilise the financial system with liquidity, recapitalisation and trying to get funds moving for small businesses and consumers," he said. "Stage two is to make sure that the problems of the financial system, which started in America, do not recur." The target was to "root out irresponsibilities and excesses" in the system. "We need supervision and regulation where it has been lacking and where it is necessary, and international co-operation. We need an early warning system and proper co-ordination" (The Times 16 October 2008). The rescue package unveiled at this meeting committed the EU countries potentially to intervening with $1.8 trillion dollars, more than double the rescue package agreed by the US Congress.
The UK rescue package won wide acceptance among the financial community, and internationally, which led US officials to emphasise that their rescue package also allowed for the government to buy preference shares in the banks they assisted. This was a clause the Democrats in Congress had insisted on inserting into the emergency act, contrary to Poulson's original intention to simply purchase the toxic debt of the banks. At a crucial moment in the international financial crisis it was apparent that the US government was adjusting its own policy and following Europe's lead: "With his new initiative, Paulson appears to be conducting an aboutface with regard to his government's previous policies and to be adopting an approach similar to that being used in Europe. Paulson's original plan envisioned primarily purchasing bad mortgages and other rotten debt in order to restore trust in the financial system. The Bush administration hadn't even considered the idea of government investments --Congress first addressed the issue in its revisions of the bailout package. According to the Wall Street Journal, the new plan largely replaces the former ideas, which failed to restore confidence, leading to dramatic decline of stock Europe and the US had come to adopt similar strategies to address the enveloping crisis, yet with different philosophies regarding the outcome. President Bush declared, "This is an essential short-term measure to ensure the viability of America's banking system. This is not intended to take over the free market, but to preserve it." The Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said the lack of confidence in the financial system was a threat to the US economy, and argued that the government taking equity stakes was "objectionable to most Americans, including myself. We regret taking these actions, but we must to restore confidence in the financial system" (BBC 14
October 2008). In contrast the President of the European Union Nicolas Sarkozy insisted "Cette crise est la crise de trop. Il faut refonder le système.... fonder un nouveau capitalisme sur des valeurs qui mettent la finance au service des entreprises et des citoyens et non l'inverse". ("This
crisis is one too much; the system has to be re-established…a new capitalism based on values that place finance in the service of businesses and citizens, and not the reverse") (France Info 27 October 2008). States. British and European financial institutions had also succumbed to the temptations of high leverage (in some cases higher than the Wall Street investment banks), minimal risk management, and a fascination with the returns that new financial securities and speculative industries -most notably the property sector -might deliver. In the UK the financial sector became gargantuan, with assets around 9 times GDP (Figure 6 ), a multiple more than double that of the U.S. finance sector. A concentration on financial services was considered in the US and UK as an essential part of the new economy, and was associated with rapid market growth, high profits and very high salaries for a privileged few dealing in the most exotic financial securities.
London basked in its developing reputation as the financial capital of the world, and when annual bonuses were paid in the finance sector, property prices in central London (already now among the highest in the world) jumped again (City of London 2008).
Fuelling the whole process of financialisation were volcanic eruptions of debt. When Alan  the increasing political and economic power of a particular class grouping: the rentier class for some (Hilferding 1985) ;
 the explosion of financial trading with a myriad of new financial instruments;
 the "pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production' (Krippner 2005) ;
 the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies (Epstein
2005:3).
There were many critics of financialisation, and the long progression of financial crises around the world served as a reminder that the system was neither self-regulating or robust (Laeven and Valencia 2008) . However few imagined that the international financial system might prove so 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
The explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions took such spectacular risks with extremely leveraged positions on many securities and derivatives, and the risk management, governance and ethical environment that allowed such conduct to take place is 
De-regulation
Financial institutions are critical to the operation of any economy, and traditionally subject to a framework of firm regulation, however as the financialisation of the US and international economy proceeded, paradoxically the regulatory touch lightened considerably. In the words of one US finance expert, in the years before the crisis "We were developing a system of very large, highly levered, undercapitalised financial institutions -including the investment banks, some large money centre banks, the insurance companies with large derivative books and the government-sponsored entities…Regulators believe that all of these are too big to fail and would bail them out if necessary. The owners, employees and creditors of these institutions are rewarded when they succeed, but it is all of us -the taxpayers -who are left on the hook if they fail. This is called private profits and socialised risk. Heads I win. Tails, you lose. It is a reverse Robin Hood system" (Einhorn 2008:16-17) .
The abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 paved the way for a regulatory loosening of the US financial system, enhanced in 2004 by a new SEC rule intended to reduce regulatory costs for broker-dealers that were part of consolidated supervised entities. Essentially this involved large broker-dealers using their own risk-management practices for regulatory purposes enabling a lowering of their capital requirements (the core capital which a bank is required to hold to support its risk-taking activities which normally includes share capital, share premium, and retained earnings). In addition the SEC amended the definition of net capital to include securities for which there was no ready market, and to include hybrid capital instruments and certain deferred tax assets, reducing the amount of capital required to engage in high risk activities.
Finally the rule eased the calculations of counter-party risk, maximum potential exposures, margin lending, and allowed broker-dealers to assign their own credit ratings to unrated companies. Einhorn comments on this regulatory capitulation of the SEC "Large broker-dealers convinced the regulators that the dealers could better measure their own risks, and with fancy math, they attempted to show that they could support more risk with less capital. I suspect that the SEC took the point of view that these were all large, well-capitalised institutions, with smart, sophisticated risk managers who had no incentive to try to fail. Consequently, they gave the industry the benefit of the doubt" (2008:16).
Ratings Agencies
As international financial markets have expanded the role of the credit ratings agencies (CRAs) have proved critical. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) claims that "CRAs assess the credit risk of corporate or government borrowers and issuers of fixedincome securities. CRAs attempt to make sense of the vast amount of information available regarding an issuer or borrower, its market and its economic circumstances in order to give investors and lenders a better understanding of the risks they face when lending to a particular borrower or when purchasing an issuer's fixed-income securities. A credit rating, typically, is a CRA's opinion of how likely an issuer is to repay, in a timely fashion, a particular debt or financial obligation, or its debts generally" (2003:1). Yet the question asked by everybody when the financial crisis erupted was how could asset backed securities containing subprime mortgages and other high risk debt possibly be given AA credit ratings by Standard and Poor's or Moody's?
The answer was again that financial innovation had outpaced regulatory prowess. The ratings agencies instead of monitoring rigorously the growth of financial markets and instruments had become junior partners in this enterprise. Coffee (2006) in his critique of the failure of the gatekeeper professions in US corporate governance including auditors, corporate lawyers, and securities analysts, raises the following issues regarding rating agencies:
Given the immense capacity of the ratings agencies to influence the fortunes of financial institutions and instruments in terms of the public perception of risk, they have maintained a highly profitable duopoly with Standard and Poor's Ratings Services and Moody's Investor Services, only recently joined by Fitch Investor services for specialised submarkets. The SEC has supported this entrenched market position, reinforced by a reputational capital only now being challenged.
ii)
Conflicts of Interest
Traditionally the ratings agencies rated thousands of clients in the corporate debt business with little chance of being captured by single clients. However as the importance of the structured debt market grew, there were only a few investment banks active but the scale of the market grew exponentially. From the 1970s the ratings agencies business changed from their revenue coming from subscribers for their ratings services, to their revenue coming from the issuers of debt products, creating a context for capture by client's interests.
iii) Complex Financial Products
Rating corporate debt utilising corporate financial history, audited financial statements, is less difficult than complex structured finance products issued by investment banks. Understanding the nature of the underlying assets and cash flows generated by these assets and the risks involved over time is a major undertaking. The ratings agencies deny any obligation to do due diligence on the portfolio backing structured finance products.
iv) Timing and Relevance
Even if the ratings agencies were close in their original rating, they do not review how a debt product may change over time in different market conditions, and rating agencies were slow to downgrade subprime asset backed securities (Scott 2008 23-24; Coffee 2006 ).
The ratings agencies believed in the investment banks of Wall Street, and in their risk controls, and assumed that 'everything was hedged.' Though the CRAs do have the power to review nonpublic information to assess the credit-worthiness of institutions and securities, they did not have the inclination, manpower or skills to do this thoroughly in all cases, and they did not get paid until they gave a rating. "The market perceives the rating agencies to be doing much more than they actually do. The agencies themselves don't directly misinform the market, but they don't disabuse the market of misperceptions -often spread by the rated entities -that the agencies do more than they actually do. This creates a false sense of security, and in times of stress, this actually makes the problems worse. Had the credit rating agencies been doing a reasonable job of disciplining the investment banks -which unfortunately happen to bring the rating agencies lots of other business -then the banks may have been prevented from taking excess risk and the current crisis might have been averted" (Einhorn 2008:13) .
Risk Management
Financial businesses activities in rapidly changing markets are highly sensitive to variance, and it might be expected that as the financial services industries have grown inexorably and financial products become more complex, that the sophistication of risk management techniques will have developed in parallel. However the reality is that innovation in financial products has far exceeded the capacity of risk management measurement and monitoring tools to gauge risk. The most widely employed risk management tool is value-at risk (VaR), which measures how much a portfolio stands to make or lose in 99% of the days. v) The report concluded with reference to risk control that there was over-reliance on VaR and stress: "MRC relied on VaR and stress numbers, even though delinquency rates were increasing and origination standards were falling in the US mortgage market. It continued to do so throughout the build-up of significant positions in subprime assets that were only partially 
Incentivisation
The final and most critical part of the explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions took such extreme risks with highly leveraged positions in complex securities, neglecting risk management, governance principles, and often basic business ethics, was that they were highly incentivised to do so. Massively incentivised irresponsibility became the operating compensation norm in the financial community, as banks and fringe financial institutions chased the super profits available as global financial markets expanded exponentially. "The management teams at the investment banks did exactly what they were incentivized to do: maximize employee compensation. Investment banks pay out 50% of revenues as compensation. So, more leverage means more revenues, which means more compensation. In good times, once they pay out the compensation, overhead and taxes, only a fraction of the incremental revenues fall to the bottom line for shareholders. The banks have done a wonderful job at public relations. Everyone knows about the 20% incentive fees in the hedge fund and private equity industry. Nobody talks about the investment banks' 50% compensation structures, which have no high-water mark and actually are exceeded in difficult times in order to retain talent" (Einhorn 2008:11) . The report on the vast write-downs at UBS examines how the compensation structure directly generated the behaviour which caused the losses, as staff were motivated to utilise the low cost of funding to invest in subprime positions. "Employee incentivisation arrangements did not differentiate between return generated by skill in creating additional returns versus returns made from exploiting UBS's comparatively low cost of funding in what were essentially carry trades…The relatively high yield attributable to subprime made this asset class an attractive long position for carry trades.
Further, the UBS funding framework amplified the incentives to pursue compensation through profitable carry trades. The compensation structure generally made little recognition of risk issues or adjustment for risk/other qualitative indicators (e.g. for group internal audit ratings, operational risk indicators, compliance issues etc.)" As a result there were insufficient incentives to protect the UBS franchise for the longer term "it remains the case that bonus payments for successful and senior international business fixed income traders, including those in the businesses holding subprime positions were significant. Essentially, bonuses were measured against gross revenue after personnel costs, with no formal account taken of the quality and sustainability of those earnings" (2008:42).
REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
While the accumulated cost of the global financial crisis was being realised the commitment to establish a new international financial regulatory framework increased. As the costs of all forms of intervention to alleviate the crisis by the US government ballooned out to $7.7 trillion dollars (including credit discounts, credit extensions, securities lending, term auction facilities, portfolio funding, money market funding, TARP, assistance to specific institutions, economic stimulus packages, and homeowner assistance), The general market assistance and specific rescue packages for individual financial institutions amounted to almost $11 trillion worldwide by October 2008 (Table 2) . While these funds could be regarded as a temporary investment in the financial economy, with the hope of recouping much of the funds back at a later stage, this was an optimistic view when the crisis spread to other sectors of the economy. As the financial crisis impacted upon the real economy the fears of a prolonged recession grew, with US industrial production falling further than it had for over 30 years, and for example the US automotive industry becoming increasingly precarious announcing further major redundancies and looking for support from the federal government (including support from the assistance intended for financial institutions, since the automotive companies had also become finance companies). The
International Labour Organisation in Geneva estimated that up to 20 million people in the world would lose their employment as a consequence of the financial crisis, and that for the first time in a decade the global total of unemployed would be above 200 million (Associated Press, 21
October 2008). The prospect of the whole world falling into recession at the same time became possible, something not witnessed since the 1930s.
Table 2 Government Support for Global Financial Crisis 2008
There was a widespread sense that this regulatory failure of financial markets could not be allowed to occur again. Chancellor of Germany, usually a stalwart ally of President Bush, derided the lack of regulation that, in her view, allowed the financial crisis to erupt in the United States and seep inexorably toward Europe. She reminded the German public that the United States and
Britain rejected her proposals in 2007 for regulating international hedge funds and bond rating agencies. "It was said for a long time, 'Let the markets take care of themselves,' " Merkel commented. Now, she added, "even America and Britain are saying, 'Yes, we need more transparency, we need better standards.' " Germany's finance minister, Peer Steinbrueck, said that the "Anglo-Saxon" capitalist system had run its course and that "new rules of the road" are These principles for reforming international financial market were broadly supported in Europe, and had public resonance in the United States where it was argued the rapid expansion of unregulated financial institutions and instruments from hedge funds to credit default swaps should be contained by extending financial reserve requirements, limiting leveraging, and ensuring trading occurred on public exchanges (Wall Street Journal 25 July 2008; IPS 2008) .
With the international financial community still in a state of profound shock, and heavily dependent upon state aid, any protests about the dangers of over-regulation were muted. Adair
Turner head of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK (responsible for regulating financial institutions) commented, "If a year and a half ago, the FSA had wanted higher capital adequacy, more information on liquidity, had said it was worried about the business models at
Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock, and had wanted to ask questions about remuneration, the fact is that we would have been strongly criticised for harming the competitiveness of the City of London, red tape, and over regulation. We are now in a different environment. We shouldn't regulate for it's own sake, but over-regulation and red tape has been used as a polemical bludgeon. We have probably been over-deferential to that rhetoric" (Guardian, 16 October 2008) .
However the question is, will the deference of regulators return when financial markets recover, and financial institutions and markets are free again to pursue their self-interest? An early indication of how entrenched the irresponsibility of the financial sector had become was the astonishing news that the surviving US financial institutions were preparing to pay 2008 end of year executive bonuses approximately equivalent to the billions of dollars of aid they had just received from Congress. While the US economy was collapsing around them, and the US public were becoming increasingly concerned how they might survive a severe recession, the executives of major banks seemed focused primarily on maintaining their bonuses. 
